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Under what institutional conditions do business groups enhance innovation 
performance? 
 
 
Abstract 
This study examines the institutional mechanisms through which business groups impact 
innovation in emerging markets. Rather than merely viewing groups as the result of a weak 
institutional environment, this study proposes that there are complementary elements between 
groups and institutions, enabling groups to benefit from interactions with their institutional 
environment. Evidence from a large sample of Chinese firms indicates that the effects of 
groups on innovation are pronounced when the group is affiliated to a higher level 
government agency and when the level of region-specific marketization is higher. The 
findings point to the context-dependent nature of the innovation and the existence of both 
substitution and complementary effects between business groups and institutions.  
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1. Introduction  
Institutional theory suggests that innovation depends on the interaction between the firm 
and its external environment (Mahmood, Chung, & Mitchell, 2012). Emerging markets, such 
as China, have less developed institutions, making the role of business groups crucial in 
addressing institutional voids – defined as the paucity of the specialized intermediaries 
needed to consummate transactions (Ricart, Enright, Ghemawat, Hart, & Khanna, 2004). As 
such, scholars often argue that business groups – legally independent firms bound together in 
formal and informal ways (Granovetter, 1995) – may facilitate innovation. Yet, although 
groups may compensate for the lack of sufficiently developed institutions (Khanna & Yafeh, 
2007), knowledge of how institutions influence innovation in business groups in emerging 
markets remains rather limited. 
Prior studies on the relationship between group affiliation and innovation have produced 
mixed findings, ranging from a positive effect (e.g., Amsden & Hikino, 1994) to a negative 
effect (Seru, 2007) and an inverted-U relationship (Mahmood & Mitchell, 2004). Therefore, 
it remains unclear why some groups benefit from innovation, but others do not (Chang, 
Chung, & Mahmood, 2006). The mixed empirical results suggest that the relationship 
between group affiliation and innovation varies in different contexts. The current study 
develops a contingency model to examine the institutional conditions under which group 
affiliation impacts innovation of emerging market enterprises (EMEs). The paper contributes 
to the literature in two ways.  
First, while prior research acknowledges that connections to governments help firms 
gain competitive advantages, little research has examined the role of different types of 
government involvement (Wang, Hong, Kafouros, & Wright, 2012). The current study 
addresses this gap by considering how the value of group affiliation is influenced by the level 
of state ownership of the group, and by examining the idiosyncratic manner in which these 
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groups are affiliated to government. The distinction between state ownership and government 
affiliation is important because, as prior research has shown, it reflects that firms exploit 
political advantages either by creating ties with government (government affiliation) or by 
incorporating government agents in their internal hierarchy (state ownership) (Boddewyn & 
Brewer, 1994; Wang et al., 2012). It also recognizes that a firm’s network is composed of 
different types of relationships (Lin, 2001) that can facilitate different advantages, create 
different pressures and impact innovation differently. 
Second, although the innovation literature often assumes institutional homogeneity 
within a given nation, in reality there is significant heterogeneity in the marketization level of 
different sub-national regions. Hence, rather than assuming that groups have to deal with the 
same institutional voids in each region, the study examines how the relationship between 
organizations and institutions varies across different institutional contexts. This 
conceptualization advances the premise that the value of group affiliation depends on 
location-specific institutional characteristics, namely, the level of market development in 
each region. 
 
2. Theoretical framework and hypotheses 
2.1. Business groups, innovation and institutional environment 
Affiliation with a group may improve innovation. Transaction cost analyses suggest that 
groups can respond to market failures and imperfections, and reduce the transaction costs 
associated with innovation by internalizing processes in the group (Khanna & Palepu, 1997). 
Similarly, from a resource-based point of view (Barney, 1991), groups provide not only an 
internal market for factors such as capital and labor for innovative activities but also a 
platform for sharing resources (Chang & Hong, 2000). An internal labor market, for example, 
can help a firm counter the rigidities and variations of the external labor market (Mahmood & 
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Mitchell, 2004), enabling groups to allocate available scientific talent to the most suitable 
projects (Khanna & Palepu, 1997).   
In line with the above view, political scientists suggest that government influences the 
development of groups, particularly in emerging markets (Evans, 1979). Hence, a group’s 
political capital acquired through its political ties may enhance its innovative activities. On 
the other hand, groups can use their economic power to shape a pro-innovation environment 
by influencing regulatory institutions. Furthermore, theory on organizational learning (Zander 
& Kogut, 1995) suggests that groups facilitate organizational learning by bringing together 
and transferring diverse knowledge across their affiliates. Knowledge sharing compensates 
for weaknesses in external technology markets (Chang, Chung, & Mahmood, 2006), 
improving affiliates’ ability to create unique technological combinations (Kafouros, Buckley 
& Clegg, 2012).  
However, groups may also hinder innovation. The internal market within groups may be 
inefficient due to agency problems arising when affiliates seek to maximize their budget 
allocation whereas the headquarters seeks to maximize the performance of the group as a 
whole (Seru, 2007).  This agency problem can lead to misallocation of resources and cross-
subsidization of unprofitable ventures by the profitable ones (George & Kabir, 2012). Groups 
will respond less efficiently to market failures and even hamper innovation when 
headquarters allocate resources in a way that leads to “tunneling” of assets from smaller to 
large members (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000). Similarly, industrial 
organization thinking suggests that as groups have significant market power, they block new 
entrants, create barriers to knowledge inflows from new businesses and therefore limit the 
diversity of new ideas (Mahmood & Mitchell, 2004).  
 Institutional theory reinforces the above predictions. Isomorphic pressures, such as 
coercive, normative and mimetic forces (Scott, 1995), influence firms’ innovative activities in 
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two ways. First, innovation strategies, structures and processes must be congruent with 
institutional demands. The coercive forces coming from governments can exert pressures 
through laws, regulations and policies. Because groups in emerging economies are created 
not only by market forces but also by governments as an instrument to implement market 
reforms (Yiu, Bruton, & Lu, 2005), they are more likely to be influenced by such pressures 
than independent firms. For example, normative expectations influence the willingness of 
group managers to innovate because fulfilling government goals such as technological catch 
up can accelerate their career. Also, due to mimetic isomorphic pressures, firms facing 
uncertainty are likely to imitate others that have gained legitimacy by innovating (DiMaggio 
& Powell, 1983).  
Second, institutions influence the availability and cost of innovation inputs as well as 
the protection of innovation outputs. For example, institutions governing the employment of 
scientists and engineers influence the availability and cost of labour, and thus the decisions of 
groups about hiring labour for innovation. Because capital markets, intermediaries and 
contract enforcement laws are not well developed in emerging markets, EMEs often need to 
form ties with government to obtain critical resources and secure favorable treatment that 
circumvents institutional voids. Furthermore, the intellectual property rights (IPR) regime 
including patent and copyright laws is a crucial part of a country’s institutional infrastructure 
for innovation. It affects not only the incentives to innovate but also the extent to which firms 
can appropriate value from their innovations. Because the institutional environment in 
emerging markets features a weak IPR regime, it often discourages innovation.  
2.2. The role of government involvement 
Government involvement can manifest itself in two conceptually and empirically 
different forms: government affiliation and state ownership. The former captures a firm’s 
relationship with government (Wank, 1995), where state ownership refers to cases in which 
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government is one of the shareholders of the firm (Wang et al., 2012). These two concepts 
are not always correlated, i.e. a state owned firm may be affiliated to a lower government 
level, whereas a private firm may be affiliated to a higher government level (Du & Girma, 
2010; Wang et al., 2012)1. The literature has established that, in China, whereas some firms 
are affiliated to central government (e.g., state or provincial-level), others are affiliated to a 
lower level (e.g., city- or county-level) (Wang et al., 2012). We argue that the level of 
government affiliation affects the ability of groups to create and appropriate value from 
innovation. Government in emerging economies can award major contracts and control 
regulatory and licensing procedures. Affiliation to higher levels of government gives groups 
not only higher legitimacy, status and protection, but also privileged access to critical 
information and opportunities to obtain government contracts and approval for new products 
(Yiu, Lau & Bruton, 2007). In addition, affiliation to higher governmental levels may help 
the firm internationalize (Wang et al., 2012) and acquire new technologies, managerial 
expertise and scientific talent from abroad. This may not be available for groups affiliated at 
lower level of government. 
Governments at higher levels can also assist groups to develop assets that increase 
value appropriation from innovation. Such assets are particularly important in weak IPR 
regimes because inexperienced groups in these emerging markets are often unable to use 
complexity to protect their innovations from imitation. For example, government at a higher 
level may allow groups to use specialized information required for developing and 
commercializing a new product (Wu, 2011). Since institutional influences do not develop in a 
vacuum, groups associated with higher government levels may also influence institutions in 
their favor to assist their innovation.   
                                                           
1 Our data show that the correlation between the two constructs is 0.47 (see Table 4 in Section 4).  
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Furthermore, different government levels have different objectives (Bai, Lu, & Tao, 
2006), exert different institutional pressures on groups and may impact innovation 
differently. Governments at lower levels (e.g., at the county level) focus on increasing 
regional output and decreasing unemployment (Li & Zhou, 2005). Encouraging groups to 
invest heavily in technology development is therefore not one of their priorities. Conversely, 
governments at higher levels are more concerned with creating world-class technological 
leaders. They therefore want to push the technological frontier and offer greater support for 
innovation of groups. Therefore, we propose:  
Hypothesis 1. The positive effects of business groups on innovation performance will be 
higher for groups affiliated to a higher level of government than to a lower level of 
government. 
Social exchange theory (Emerson, 1976) suggests that groups and government engage 
in social exchange to achieve mutual goals. Business groups rely on government to get access 
to scarce resources that are not available through market channels (Wang et al., 2012), while 
government achieves its policy objectives by working as an ally of groups (Ghemawat & 
Khanna, 1998; Yiu et al., 2005). A higher degree of state ownership ensures that decision-
making within state-owned groups is aligned with the strategic objectives of the state, 
including technological catch up and international knowledge sourcing. In return, such ties 
with government help the group secure legitimacy and privileged market access, obtain 
critical resources and reduce environmental uncertainty.  
When government partly owns the firm, state owned groups receive additional 
support from government compared with the cases where they are affiliated to government. 
State-owned groups in China, for example, are often given direct government subsidies, 
lower taxes, easier access to credit, protected home markets against domestic and foreign 
competition and privileged access to domestic government procurement markets. For 
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example, Chinese government’s stake in the Lenovo Group has given the firm support, such 
as financial underwriting and privileged access to markets (Luo and Tung, 2007). Many of 
these groups are granted a monopoly, with private enterprises not allowed to participate.  
State ownership can also help groups widen the scope of their technological base. 
Some organizations, particularly state owned groups, can access outputs of publicly-funded 
R&D that are often unavailable to other firms. Hence, they have the opportunity to add both 
new and different elements to their resource base, increasing the likelihood of finding 
valuable and rare technological combinations. Further, state ownership can help firms attract 
foreign technology providers (Buckley, Wang & Clegg, 2007), widening the technological 
options of all group affiliates. Such complementarities may reduce information and 
innovation costs, assist groups in allocating their resources more efficiently, and thereby 
enhance innovation performance. Compared to non-state groups, groups with high levels of 
state ownership are also better protected by the state in terms of IPR (Li, Park & Li, 2004 
1999). As discrimination may prohibit non-state groups from obtaining important 
complementary resources, direct government support is less likely to be positively associated 
with the innovation activities of non-state groups. Hence: 
Hypothesis 2. The positive effects of business groups on innovation will be higher for groups 
with a higher level of state ownership than for groups with a lower level of state ownership.  
 
2.3. The role of region-specific marketization  
Market development can be defined as the degree to which a region possesses market-
oriented institutions, such as capital markets and labor markets (Khanna & Palepu, 1997; 
Ghemawhat & Khanna, 1998). Sub-national regions in emerging countries, especially large 
countries, differ significantly in the degree of market development needed for commercial 
activity. While market institutions are well developed in some regions, non-market influences 
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and government interventions are common in other regions. The notion that one of the key 
benefits of groups is that they can effectively respond to market failures implies that such 
benefits are likely to be less important in regions where institutions are more established 
(Chang et al., 2006). For example, access to internal capital markets through group-based 
mechanisms will be less critical when alternative sources of capital, such as venture capital, 
are available. This argument, however, does not necessarily suggest that market mechanisms 
are not important for the innovation-enhancing effects of groups. Firstly, the market 
development creates a well-functioning market-oriented legal system and stronger 
enforcement mechanisms (Kafouros et al., 2012). This, in turn, enhances the flow of factors 
within the group and hence the effects of groups on innovation. Moreover, because the 
market development creates a stronger legal system and stronger enforcement mechanisms 
(Kafouros et al., 2012), groups affiliates in regions with well-established market systems will 
be better protected from the ‘tunneling’ effect which, through transfer of assets, supports the 
innovation of large affiliates but not that of smaller affiliates (Seru, 2007). 
Secondly, groups in regions with well-developed markets are likely to adopt a market-
driven strategy and capitalize on the advantages of markets when it comes to coordinating 
factors for innovation. Governments in these regions focus on fostering innovation networks 
that stimulate the recombination of ideas (Mahmood & Rufin, 2005). Because there is greater 
availability of external resources that creates more opportunities for innovation (Kafouros 
and Forsans, 2012), market development in these regions may increase a group’s 
innovativeness (Mahmood et al., 2012). Finally, the development of market institutions 
stimulates competition, which in turn increases the incentives for innovation (Mahmood et 
al., 2012). Hence, there is a complementary effect between groups and market development 
in emerging economies.  
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Hypothesis 3: The positive effects of business groups on innovation performance will be 
higher in sub-national regions with higher levels of marketization than in sub-national regions 
with lower levels of marketization. Figure 1 illustrates the conceptual model.  
(Insert Figure 1 here) 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1. Sample and data 
The analysis relies on a firm-level panel dataset of the Chinese manufacturing industry for the 
period of 2005-2007. Chinese firms are a particularly interesting group due to the 
idiosyncratic manner in which they are affiliated to government and the variations in 
institutions across regions (Wang et al., 2012). The paper uses data from the Annual Census 
of Chinese Industrial Firms compiled by the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS) for 
the period of 2005-2007. The Census provides detailed firm-level financial and operational 
information for all firms with an annual turnover of over five million Renminbi (around 
$680,000), including groups. It adopts the definition of business groups provided by the State 
Administration for Industry and Commerce of China (SAIC): a group consists of legally 
independent entities that are partly or wholly owned by a parent firm and registered as 
affiliated firms of that parent firm; its core company should have the register capital of over 
50 million yuan (around US$ 6.8 million), at least 5 affiliated companies, and the total 
register capital of the core and other affiliated companies should be over 100 million yuan 
(around US$13.6 million). The Census is one of the most comprehensive datasets ever 
compiled by the Chinese statistical office, accounting for about 90 per cent of total output in 
most industries2. It has also maintained consistency in data collection across time, industries 
and regions (Zhou & Li, 2008). The quality of the data has been improved by undertaking 
extensive checks for coding errors (identifier code, industry code and geographical code), 
                                                           
2 The database has been used by numerous studies (e.g., Girma et al., 2009; Wang et al., 2012; Yi et al., 2013). 
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missing values and possible organizational changes (e.g., mergers and acquisitions). Outliers 
have also been removed. This process removed 33,083 firms out of the total of 388,602 firms, 
leaving us a final dataset of 355,519 firms (including both state owned and non-state owned), 
covering 30 two-digit manufacturing sectors throughout all 31 provinces, autonomous 
regions and municipalities in China.  
Tables 1 and 2 provide a brief description of the groups and independent firms in the 
sample. Table 1 shows that 2.5 percent of the sample firms were business groups, and that 
10.24 percent of them engaged in innovation during the sample period. The innovation 
performance of Chinese firms – measured as new product sales over total sales – is low 
(approximately 3 percent), supporting the view that Chinese firms are not as innovative as 
their western counterparts (Yi, Wang, & Kafouros, 2013). Table 2 shows that innovation 
performance is higher for groups than for independent firms. This observation is in line with 
the theoretical discussion in Section 2 and previous findings (e.g., Amsden & Hikino, 1994). 
The data also suggest that this performance discrepancy can be attributed to differences in 
capital intensity and R&D intensity. Prior research emphasizes the role of government in the 
formation and development of groups in emerging markets (Yiu et al., 2005). This view is 
supported by the data that indicate that the levels of state ownership and government 
affiliation are higher in groups than in independent firms. This may explain why groups have 
higher innovation performance than independent firms. 
                                             (Insert Table 1 here) 
                                                     (Insert Table 2 here) 
 3.2. Measures 
Dependent and independent variables. The dependent variable is innovation performance. 
Following numerous studies (e.g., Liu & Buck, 2007; Wang & Kafouros, 2009; Yi et al., 
2013), this paper measures innovation performance using the share of new product sales over 
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total sales. This operationalization offers several advantages over other measures. First, as 
new product sales reflect the outcomes of innovation activities, it is commonly thought to be 
a good indicator of market acceptance of a new product (Atuahene-Gima & Li, 2004). 
Second, this measure includes innovations that are not patented but are employed in the 
production process (Liu & Buck, 2007). Although patents are good indicators of 
technological developments, they often do not reflect the economic value of these 
technologies, and not all innovations are patentable.  
The key independent variable is business group. It is operationalized as a dummy 
which equals to 1 if the firm qualifies the definition of the SAIC for a business group (i.e. has 
at least 5 affiliated but independent entities) (which is discussed earlier), and equals to 0 
otherwise. The paper further includes four institutional variables that may influence 
innovation performance. Government affiliation refers to the situation where a firm is 
attached to government (central or local) and the government takes a mentoring role. In 
China, this is a legacy originated from the era when the country adopted a central planning 
system in which every company has a government boss and all companies should report to 
their respective government agencies. This variable is constructed for each firm separately 
using the “government level” at which the firm is affiliated (Wang et al., 2012). This research 
assigns values of 5, 4, 3, 2, and 1 for central government, provincial government, prefectural 
and city government, county government, and others including the situations where the firm 
is not affiliated to any government. State ownership is measured by the share of state-owned 
assets in total assets (Wang, Hong, Kafouros, & Boateng, 2012). We operationalize 
marketization adopting a measure developed by Fan, Wang, & Zhu (2010) for 2005-2007.3 
This is a comprehensive composite index that evaluates the development of market-based 
mechanisms in each of China’s regions. It covers five key areas including the role of market 
                                                           
3 The values of the index calculated by Fan et al. (2010) for 2005-2007 range from 2.64 to 11.71 among China’s Regions. 
This measure has been used in several other studies (e.g., Du, Lu & Tao, 2008). 
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relative to government, the development of the private sector, the development of commodity 
and factor markets, and the development of free market institutions by a total of twenty-six 
indicators. A higher score indicates a stronger marketization regime.  
Control variables. First, previous studies suggest that firm size is positively associated with 
innovation performance (e.g., Yi et al., 2013). This paper controls for firm size using the 
natural logarithm of total number of employees (Yi et al., 2013). Second, a firm’s age can 
increase innovation performance by facilitating the accumulation of knowledge and 
experience. The paper controls for firm age using a measure of the number of years since the 
firm was founded (Wang et al., 2012). Third, foreign ownership may stimulate innovation 
due to knowledge spillovers (Wang & Kafouros, 2009). Foreign ownership is measured using 
the ratio of assets owned by foreign investors to the total assets in a firm (Yi et al., 2013). 
Similarly, private ownership provides tighter monitoring and more effective managerial 
incentives than public ownership for innovation (Vickers & Yarrow, 1988). Private 
ownership is measured by the ratio of assets owned by private investors to the total assets in a 
firm. Fourth, export-oriented firms may react to high competition in the export markets by 
intensively engaging in innovation. This paper controls for export intensity by using the share 
of export sales to total sales (Wang et al., 2012). Fifth, as innovation performance depends on 
R&D inputs, R&D intensity is included, measured as total R&D expenditure divided by total 
sales (Zhang, Li, Hitt, & Cui, 2007). Sixth, since profitable firms may invest more in R&D, 
this effect is controlled for by incorporating a return to assets variable, measured by the ratio 
of total profits to total assets (Chen & Miller, 2007). Finally, additional dummies are included 
to account for idiosyncrasies associated with industry, region and time variations. Table 3 
summarizes the variables and their expected effects on innovation performance. Table 4 
presents the mean, standard variation and correlation matrix for the key variables. All 
correlations among the independent variables are fairly low. The variance inflation factor 
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(VIF) ranges from 1.01 to 1. 89 and the average value is well below the acceptable level of 10 
(Neter, Wasserman, & Kutner, 1985), indicating that multicollinearity does not influence the 
estimates. 
(Insert Tables 3 and 4 here) 
3.3. Model specification and estimation 
We test the hypotheses by using the following regression specification: 
  ittkj1-it1-it1-it1-it1-itit ελλλδZγMBβMαBY                                                 (1) 
where itY  is innovation performance, 1-itB  is business group, 1-itM  denotes the four 
moderators – government affiliation, state ownership and region-specific marketization, 
1it1-it MB   are the interaction terms between business group and each of the three 
moderators, 1-itZ  are control variables, jλ , kλ  and tλ  are industry, region and time fixed 
effects respectively, and itε  is the error term. While the coefficient of 1-itB explains the effect 
of groups on innovation performance, we are more interested in the coefficients of the three 
interaction terms that are used to test the three hypotheses. We used pooled OLS to estimate 
equation (1), while controlling for industry, region and time effects. 
Since unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity may affect the relationship between 
groups and innovation performance, we also include a firm-specific effect iλ  to account for 
this effect: 
  ittkji1-it1-it1-it1-it1-itit ελλλλδZγMBβMαBY                                          (2) 
Reverse causality problems associated with the possibility that innovation performance 
may impact some firm characteristics, causing estimation biases. We follow previous studies 
(Aitken & Chen & Miller, 2007; Wang, et al., 2012) and lag all independent variables by one 
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year to control for possible endogeneity. 4  This treatment makes endogenous variables 
predetermined and less likely to be correlated with the error term. The adoption of lags also 
accounts for the fact that these effects may take some time to materialize. Furthermore, even 
though multicollinearity appears not to be a concern in this study, we followed the usual 
practice (Aiken & West, 1991) and mean-centered variables in the interaction terms when we 
estimated the models. This helps to avoid problems of multicollinearity and increases 
interpretability of interactions (Aiken & West, 1991). To deal with the possible threat of 
heteroskedasticity, we estimated the model using Huber-White’s robust standard error 
(White, 1980). Finally, we use hierarchical moderated regression analyses (Fang & Zou, 2009; 
Wang et al., 2012; Yi et al., 2013) when we estimate the above models. Hierarchical multiple 
regressions allow us to determine the order that variables are entered into the regression 
equation in order to test the effects of certain predictors independent of the influence of 
others.  
 
4. Results 
Table 5 presents the results from the estimation of equation (1). Model 1 serves as the 
baseline model as it includes the predictor variable (Business group) and control variables 
only. The results confirm that being a business group is positively associated with innovation 
performance (Amsden & Hikino, 1994). Institutional variables are added in Models 2 and 3.5 
All these variables are highly statistically significant, highlighting the role of institutional 
factors in shaping EMEs’ innovation performance. Models 4-6 present the results for the 
hypotheses pertaining to the contingency approach (H1-H3). Following the usual practice in 
                                                           
4 Because the sample spans three years only and the study uses panel data, it is almost unlikely to use lags of two or three 
years.  
5 As the correlation between state ownership and government affiliation is relatively high (0.46), the two variables were 
entered in two separate regressions.  
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moderated regression analysis (e.g., Wang et al., 2012), this paper enters two-way 
interactions in these models successively. Hypothesis 1 suggests that the effect of groups on 
innovation is reinforced by the level of government affiliation. The interaction term in Model 
4 is significant, supporting Hypothesis 1. This suggests that the effects of groups are 
particularly pronounced when the level of government affiliation is high. By contrast, the 
interaction term in Model 5 is statistically insignificant, lending no support to Hypothesis 2. 
This finding suggests that the positive and negative effects of state ownership balance out in 
the data. Finally, as the coefficient of the interaction term in Model 6 is positive and 
significant, Hypothesis 3 is corroborated. It should be noted that these significant results are 
partly attributed to the use of a large sample that increases the significance of the estimates by 
allowing us to estimate the parameters with high precision and reduce the effect of 
multicollinearity on the estimates (Wooldridge, 2010). However, since statistical significance 
does not equal economic significance, very small coefficients may have little economic 
impact. Therefore, to explain better the moderating effects of government involvement, we 
have graphically presented these relationships in Figure 2.  
(Insert Table 5 here) 
(Insert Figure 2 here) 
Robustness checks. To control for the estimation bias associated with unobserved 
firm-level heterogeneity, this study incorporated several variables that account for firm 
characteristics, and adopted a lag structure for independent variables.  Nevertheless, to further 
check the robustness of the results, the paper also used panel data methods to control for such 
effects. To do this, it was necessary to choose between fixed and random effects models. The 
choice between the two depends on whether the unobserved individual effects correlate with 
the observed explanatory variables in the model. The random effects model is preferred to the 
fixed effects model if the correlation between the unobserved effects and the regressors is 
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low. Otherwise, the fixed-effects model is more appropriate. Although the Hausman test can 
be used to make a choice between the two methods, this study employs the random effects 
model rather than the fixed effects model for a number of reasons. First, our sample is drawn 
from a large population, accounting for about 90% of total output in most industries, which 
may make it more appropriate to treat firm specific effects as randomly distributed over time 
for each individual firm (Nieto & Rodrıguez, 2011). Second, because the business group 
variable is constructed as a dummy, the use of fixed-effects regression will remove the effect 
of the business group on innovation. Finally, fixed-effects model typically produces biased 
estimates when the time span is relatively short (Nieto & Rodrıguez, 2011). Since our sample 
span three years only, the fixed effects model is not appropriate. Table 5A presents the results 
of estimation of equation (2) with random-effects method. The key results remained 
qualitatively the same. 
(Insert Table 5A here) 
5. Discussion 
Although extant research suggests that groups play an instrumental role in EMEs’ 
innovation, it implicitly assumes that the impact of groups is similar regardless of the types 
and levels of government involvement in the group. We challenge this assumption, 
demonstrating that the innovation-enhancing effects of groups are contingent upon the level 
of government affiliation and state ownership. Furthermore, although the literature has 
established that groups are better able to respond to market failures (Khanna & Palepu, 1997), 
it remains unclear how the development of market mechanisms shapes the way in which 
groups innovate. The current study underscores the important role of these institutional forces 
in unlocking EMEs’ potential for innovation. It further shows that groups are not equally 
beneficial for all EMEs, but depend on the types of government involvement and the market 
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development of the region in which the group operates.  This analysis has a number of 
implications. 
First, although several studies recognize that governments are behind the rise of groups 
in emerging markets (e.g., Mahmood & Rufin, 2005), the role of governments in shaping the 
effects of group affiliation on innovation remains underexplored. The study demonstrates 
how government influences the ability of emerging market groups to innovate and extends 
the literature on the relationship between government and groups in emerging markets by 
showing that government affects the relationship between group affiliation and innovation 
performance. Furthermore, the analysis also provides a new explanation for the sources of 
competitive advantages that enable EMEs to innovate and compete globally even though they 
often do not possess internal innovative capabilities and operate in environments that, 
according to theory, do not stimulate innovation. 
Second, unlike studies that treat government as a unidimensional construct, this paper 
proposes two distinct firm-level dimensions of government involvement; namely, the degree 
of state ownership in a given firm, and the level at which the firm is affiliated to government. 
The empirical findings show that government affiliation has a positive moderating effect on 
the relationship between group affiliation and innovation. By contrast, although state 
ownership has an independent effect on innovation, it does not reinforce the effect of group 
affiliation on innovation. This finding reflects the fact that market-based economic reforms in 
China have gradually reduced government favoritism toward state-owned groups, limiting 
their access to critical resources (Delios, Wu, & Zhou, 2006). In such circumstances, the role 
of groups in filling ownership voids becomes less important. Nevertheless, the contrasting 
effects of state ownership and government affiliation highlight the importance of 
differentiating between different types of government involvement in EMEs. By explicitly 
differentiating different types and levels of government ownership and affiliation, our 
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approach deepens understanding of the complex mechanisms through which government 
involvement influences the innovation of EMEs. The study thus advances the literature on the 
role of government in EMEs’ innovation by explaining not only whether government matters 
but also how and which levels of government matter for innovation. 
Third, the business group literature often assumes that there is institutional homogeneity 
within a given nation. In contrast, this study advances the premise that institutional 
parameters are specific to each sub-national region and that such location-specific variations 
influence the relationship between groups and innovation. The findings show that this 
relationship is stronger in regions with a higher degree of marketization than in regions with a 
lower degree of marketization. This suggests that the ability of firms to use groups to enhance 
innovation is conditioned by location-specific institutional idiosyncrasies (Chang et al., 
2006). This study suggests that both complementary and substitutable effects exist between 
groups and institutions, and further demonstrates that the examination of institutions at 
country-level without capturing intra-national diversity may mask their role in shaping 
innovation performance.  Overall, the findings of the study help to explain why and how, in 
emerging markets featuring weak institutions, some groups are more innovative than others.  
Apart from the implications for academic research, the findings offer important 
guidelines to business group managers by showing how they can take advantage of the 
institutional environment in which they operate. Establishing links with higher governmental 
levels, and locating the business group’s units in regions with a high degree of marketization, 
can prove an effective means to enhance innovation performance. As this view focuses on 
external relationships and power (Capron & Chatain, 2008), it differs from traditional 
prescriptions that emphasize internal efficiency and R&D capabilities. Nevertheless, this does 
not imply that managers should always rely only on advantages derived from their 
institutional environment and pay less attention to the development of firm-specific 
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resources. Reliance on political institutions and government may reduce the firm’s motivation 
to become technologically competitive through developing internal technological capabilities. 
Nevertheless, this study has several limitations. First, it focuses on the interplay between 
groups and several favorable institutional factors. However, it places less emphasis on a 
number of institutional setups that may hinder the role of groups in emerging markets. Future 
research should consider such disadvantages and identify the conditions under which the 
negative effects of institutional factors may outweigh the associated benefits. Second, as the 
empirical results rely on Chinese firms, it may not be possible to generalize the findings. For 
instance, Chinese business groups may exhibit a particular set of characteristics because of 
the dominance of large SOEs and the unique role of government. As institutions and 
regulations vary significantly across emerging markets, future studies based on other 
emerging countries will identify such differences. Third, both groups and the institutional 
environment in emerging markets evolve rapidly. The role of both groups and government 
institutions in emerging markets may fade away as they converge with those in Western 
economies. Although the time length of the data does not allow the research to examine the 
co-evolution of groups and governments and its consequences for innovation, this is a 
promising research topic that warrants further investigation.  
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Table 1 Business group and innovation patterns of Chinese firms 
Year All firms Business groups Innovators Innovation performance 
2005 245,493 7,405 (3.0%) 24,417 ( 9.9% ) 0.030 
2006 272,671 7,120 (2.6%) 28,149 (10.3%) 0.032 
2007 300,545 6,220 (2.1%) 31,295 (10.4%) 0.032 
Average 272,903 6,915 (2.5%) 27,954 (10.2%) 0.031 
Note: Innovators are firms that report positive R&D expenditures. Innovation performance is the ratio of new product sales over total sales. Percentage shares of total sample are reported in 
parentheses.  
 
Comment [P1]: Jingtao: please get the position 
of ‘Note’ right. 
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Table 2 Differences between business groups and independent firms 
 Variables Independent firms  Business groups  Difference 
Mean Median S.d. Min Max  Mean Median S.d. Min Max  
2005 Innovation performance  0.029 0 0.134 0 1  0.065 0 0.178 0 1  0.030*** 
 Capital intensity  90 41 247 0.002 30,119  112 57 210 0.004 7,067  0.267*** 
 R&D intensity  0.001 0 0.013 0 0.918  0.004 0 0.019 0 0.783  0.002*** 
 State ownership  0.043 0 0.192 0 1  0.164 0 0.192 0 1  0.105*** 
 Government affiliation  1.277 1 0.742 1 5  1.919 1 0.742 1 5  0.266*** 
2006 Innovation performance  0.031 0 0.138 0 1  0.077 0 0.196 0 1  0.036*** 
 Capital intensity  97 45 329 0.001 84,198  123 60 383 0.006 24,825  0.259*** 
 R&D intensity  0.002 0 0.014 0 0.963  0.004 0 0.022 0 0.677  0.002*** 
 State ownership  0.033 0 0.169 0 1  0.141 0 0.330 0 1  0.096*** 
 Government affiliation  1.244 1 0.698 1 5  1.824 1 1.261 1 5  0.245*** 
2007 Innovation performance  0.031 0 0.139 0 1  0.075 0 0.198 0 1  0.027*** 
 Capital intensity  102 48 480 0.001 209,521  103 55 212 0.012 9,990  0.138*** 
 R&D intensity  0.002 0 0.014 0 0.991  0.005 0 0.022 0 0.859  0.002*** 
 State ownership  0.020 0 0.132 0 1  0.091 0 0.274 0 1  0.067*** 
 Government affiliation  1.209 1 0.638 1 5  1.632 1 1.138 1 5  0.190*** 
Overall Innovation performance  0.030 0 0.137 0 1  0.072 0 0.190 0 1  0.031*** 
 Capital intensity  97 45 373 0.001 209,521  113 57 282 0.004 24,825  0.214*** 
 R&D intensity  0.002 0 0.014 0 0.991  0.004 0 0.021 0 0.859  0.002*** 
 State ownership  0.031 0 0.164 0 1  0.134 0 0.324 0 1  0.093*** 
 Government affiliation  1.241 1 0.691 1 5  1.800 1 1.240 1 5  0.238*** 
Note: Difference is the coefficient on business group in a regression of the log of the firm characteristics on business group, 2-digit industry dummies and regional dummies. 
*** Significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 3 Definition of variables 
  Definition Expected 
Dependent variable   
Innovation 
performance 
Ratio of new product sales to total sales  
Independent variable   
Business group  Dummy, equals to 1 if the firm contains more than one legally independent internal unit + 
Moderators   
Government affiliation A value of 5 is assigned for central government affiliation, 4 for provincial, 3 for city, 2 
for county, 1 for others 
+ 
State ownership Ratio of state-owned assets to total assets + 
Marketization Region-specific marketization index by Fan et al. (2010) +/- 
Control variables   
Firm size Log (number of employees) + 
Firm age Number of years since establishment + 
Foreign ownership Foreign capital share + 
Private ownership Private capital share + 
Export intensity Ratio of export sales to total sales + 
R&D intensity Ratio of R&D expenditures to total sales in a lagged period + 
Return to assets Ratio of total profits to total assets in a lagged period + 
Industry dummy Dummy, equals to 1 if affiliated at the corresponding two-digit industry  
Region dummy Dummy, equals to 1 if located at the corresponding province-level region  
Year dummy Dummy, equals to 1 if associated with the corresponding year  
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Table 4 Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix of variables 
 Mean Standard 
deviation 
            
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 Innovation performance 0.031 0.139 1.00            
2 Business group  0.025 0.157 0.05 1.00           
3 Government affiliation 1.255 0.715 0.09 0.12 1.00          
4 State ownership 0.034 0.171 0.03 0.10 0.47 1.00         
5 Marketization 9.043 1.728 0.03 -0.02 -0.22 -0.16 1.00        
6 Firm size 4.641 1.074 0.08 0.14 0.16 0.07 -0.04 1.00       
7 Firm age 8.150 9.000 0.05 0.15 0.32 0.32 -0.05 0.20 1.00      
8 Foreign ownership 0.084 0.261 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.05 0.11 0.12 -0.05 1.00     
9 Private ownership 0.750 0.411 -0.00 -0.03 -0.16 -0.33 -0.09 -0.21 -0.17 -0.52 1.00    
10 Export intensity 0.170 0.340 0.05 -0.01 -0.08 -0.07 0.24 0.24 -0.01 0.26 -0.29 1.00   
11 R&D intensity 0.002 0.014 0.19 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 1.00  
12 Return to assets 0.101 0.436 -0.01 -0.02 -0.06 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 0.05 -0.03 -0.01 1.00 
Note: All the correlation coefficients are statistically different from zero at the 1% significance level.  
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Table 5 Hierarchical moderated regression of innovation performance 2005-2007  
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Independent variable        
Business group 0.015*** 0.012*** 0.015*** 0.010*** 0.014*** 0.020*** 
Moderators       
Government affiliation  0.011***  0.011***  0.013*** 
State ownership   0.014***  0.014***  
Marketization  0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.004*** 
Interactions        
Business group×Government affiliation    0.004***   
Business group×State ownership     0.002  
Business group×Marketization      0.003*** 
Control variables       
Firm size 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.009*** 
Firm age 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Foreign ownership 0.001 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.005*** 
Private ownership 0.009*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.019*** 
Export intensity 0.009*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.013*** 
R&D intensity 1.623*** 1.589*** 1.618*** 1.588*** 1.618*** 1.703*** 
Return to assets 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.001** 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample size 460,176 460,017 460,017 460,017 460,017 460,017 
F-statistic 236.47*** 236.03*** 230.76*** 232.77*** 227.52*** 233.93*** 
Adjusted R2 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 
Note: *, ** and *** are significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.  
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Table 5A Random effects regression of innovation performance 2005-2007 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Independent variable       
Business group 0.014*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.010*** 0.013*** 0.018*** 
Moderators       
Government affiliation  0.010***  0.010***  0.012*** 
State ownership   0.010***  0.009***  
Marketization  0.011*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.004*** 
Interactions        
Business group×Government affiliation    0.005***   
Business group ×State ownership     0.006  
Business group×Marketization      0.001** 
Control variables       
Firm size 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.009*** 
Firm age 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Foreign ownership 0.001 0.003*** 0.002** 0.003*** 0.002** 0.003*** 
Private ownership 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.014*** 
Export intensity 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 
R&D intensity 0.910*** 0.893*** 0.906*** 0.893*** 0.906*** 0.947*** 
Return to assets 0.002** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.000* 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample size 460,176 460,017 460,017 460,017 460,017 460,017 
Wald test of full model 24515.73*** 25599.41*** 24662.87*** 25620.83*** 24665.01*** 15319.61*** 
Adjusted R2 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 
Note: *, ** and *** are significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.  
 
 
